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Aid Uncertainty and Growth 1
AID INSTABILITY AS A MEASURE OF UNCERTAINTY AND THE POSITIVE
IMPACT OF AID ON GROWTH
by
Robert Lensink* and Oliver Morrissey**
Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature on aid and economic growth. We posit that it is
not the level of aid flows per se but the stability of such flows that determines the impact
of aid on economic growth. Three measures of aid instability are employed. One is a
simple deviation from trend, and measures overall instability. The other measures are
based on auto-regressive estimates to capture deviations from an expected trend. These
measures are intended to proxy for uncertainty in aid receipts. We posit that such
uncertainty will influence the relationship between aid and investment and how recipient
governments respond to aid, and will therefore affect how aid impacts on growth. We
estimate a standard cross-country growth regression including the level of aid, and find
aid to be insignificant (in line with other results in the literature). We then introduce
measures of instability. Aid remains insignificant when we account for overall instability.
However, when we account for uncertainty (which is negative and significant), we find
that aid has a significant positive effect on growth. We conduct stability tests that show
that the significance of aid is largely due to its effect on the volume of investment. The
finding that uncertainty of aid receipts reduces the effectiveness of aid is robust. When
we control for this, aid appears to have a significant positive influence on growth. When
the regression is estimated for the sub-sample of African countries these findings hold,
although the effectiveness of aid appears weaker than for the full sample.
*Faculty of Economics, University of Groningen, PO Box 800, 9700 A Groningen, The Netherlands, and
External Fellow, CREDIT, University of Nottingham (Email: b.w.lensink@eco.rug.nl).
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1 Introduction
This paper is intended as a contribution to the literature on aid and growth. As such, it is not our
intention to offer a comprehensive critique or review of that literature, although we do discuss
the most relevant recent contributions. Rather, we wish to draw attention to the potential
importance of a previously neglected factor, namely that aid receipts (and capital inflows more
generally) tend to be volatile over time. As capital inflows are important determinants of
investment decisions, that in turn are influences on growth, such volatility may impact on growth.
Similarly, aid is an important component of government revenues therefore volatility of receipts
may impact on fiscal behaviour, that in turn may influence growth. Thus, we investigate whether
uncertainty associated with (volatility or instability of) the level of aid inflows affects the impact
of aid on growth.
Endogenous growth theory, that motivates most recent empirical work, does not provide a
direct link between aid and growth. Rather, any potential impact of aid on growth is conditional
on aid affecting a determinant of growth, such as investment. Moreover, any effects of aid will
be influenced, if not determined, by how the aid affects government behaviour. On a related
theme, more frequently addressed in the literature, government policy will influence the
effectiveness of aid. Most commentators would agree that the effectiveness of aid partly
depends on economic policies in the recipient countries. In most studies the implicit approach
taken is to argue that recipient governments, by their actual behaviour (fungibility or having
inappropriate economic policies), undermine the effectiveness of aid. It is also possible that the
effectiveness of aid is affected by donor policies. One candidate is the stability of the donor-
recipient relationship, and related to that the stability of aid flows to developing countries. It may
well be the case that foreign aid is much more effective when the inflow is expected.
Uncertainties with respect to inflows may render aid less effective as investors, confronted with
uncertainty, may decide to postpone or even cancel investment decisions. Uncertainty may have
similar effects on the investment decisions and broader fiscal behaviour, of governments.
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A brief review of the existing literature is presented in Section 2, which elaborates on the issues
of most concern to us. The variables we will introduce into the regressions to proxy for
uncertainty are measures of aid flow instability. The motivation behind these measures is
explained in Section 3. On the one hand, instability (or unpredictable variability) of inflows will
be related to investment uncertainty, and the relationship between aid and investment is crucial
to any effect of aid on growth. On the other hand, if aid receipts are highly variable over time
this will render it more difficult for governments to manage the budget and establish fiscal
stability. Thus, aid instability may have an adverse effect on economic policy. In Section 4 we
describe the measures of aid instability and uncertainty that will be used in the empirical analysis.
Section 5 presents the econometric results, based on standard Barro (1991) cross-country
growth regressions. In Section 6 we present stability analysis to test the reliability of the results;
surprisingly, most empirical aid-growth studies fail to present stability tests, including the oft
cited studies of Boone (1996) and Burnside and Dollar (1997). Section 7 concludes.
2 Empirical Issues in Identifying the Impact of Aid on Growth
Evidence on the relationship between aid and growth, or economic performance more generally,
is quite important for at least two reasons. First, it contributes to understanding how aid impacts
on an economy. Second, findings on the relationship will influence aid policy. Clearly, the latter
should depend on our understanding of the former. Considerable publicity has been granted to
certain studies arguing that aid is ineffective and, at least implicitly, attributing the blame for this
largely to recipient governments (e.g. Boone, 1994, 1996). Similarly, the Burnside and Dollar
(1997) approach effectively blames recipient governments for not having appropriate economic
policies. The view of the World Bank (1998) appears to be that aid is only effective if
appropriate policies are in place, and this provides an argument for conditional lending (i.e. the
receipt of aid is conditional on agreeing to implement a programme of economic policy reforms).
It is worth considering how these studies address the way in which aid impacts on an economy,
and how this relates to the prevailing economic policy environment.
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Burnside and Dollar (1997) are quite clear. Aid can be effective if it boosts income and as a
result the savings rate is increased; inappropriate government policy can prevent the latter
(because, in effect, it discourages savings). Hence, aid is only likely to impact on growth if
appropriate policies are in place. Boone (1994) is less clear: a growth model is used to
‘motivate’ the empirical analysis, but no explicit role for aid in the growth model is introduced.
Aid appears as a component of investment in physical capital, and can only contribute to growth
through this contribution to investment (thus, there is no role for beneficial effects of aid for
investment in human capital or intended for consumption by, for example, low income groups).
In both models, there is an explicit link between aid and investment; inappropriate government
policies have an adverse effect because they undermine this link.
The effect of policy on the relationship between aid and growth is by no means clear; an even
reading of the evidence suggests that both aid and policy have independent effects on growth.
The principal factor determining the impact of aid on growth appears, in many results, to be
investment (as implied in the underlying theoretical models). ‘Aid impacts positively on
investment and therefore on growth … in attempts at explaining how aid impacts on growth,
seemingly insignificant results should come as no major surprise when aid impact is conditional
on what happens to physical investment and human capital’ (Hansen and Tarp, 1999: 30).1
On balance, there is evidence that aid may be positively correlated with growth, but some
controversy regarding how aid interacts with policy. Burnside and Dollar (1997) assert that the
positive effect is only observed when appropriate policies are present. Durbarry et al (1998)
find that the impact of aid on growth is enhanced by, but not dependent on, appropriate
economic policy variables.2  Similarly, Hansen and Tarp (1999) find that the impact of aid on
                                                                
1 Burnside and Dollar (1997) do not include investment; it is possible that the significant policy terms in their
regressions are actually picking up an investment effect. Durbarry et al (1998) do not include investment as
an explanatory variable but include the various sources of investment funds such as domestic savings and
private capital inflows. Results for these variables are mixed.
2 They also find that there appears to be an optimal aid/GDP ratio, of 40-45%, in terms of the impact on
growth; in cases where the ratio is greater or quite low, aid does not appear to have a positive impact on
growth. Lensink and White (1998b) obtain a comparable result. Hansen and Tarp (1999) find a positive
impact of aid on growth for countries with a ratio below 25%.
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growth arises from a positive impact of aid on investment; while ‘good’ policy is conducive to
growth, it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for aid to have a positive impact. One
could equally argue that the effectiveness (or choice) of policy may be conditional on aid. For
example, governments with a predictable inflow of aid may be better able to achieve
macroeconomic stability. To complicate the relationship further, achieving specified
macroeconomic targets may be a requirement if the aid inflow is to be predictable, i.e.
conditionality introduces a causal link from policy to aid.
If one finds an effect of aid on growth, it is likely that this arose at least primarily through a link
between aid and investment (a relationship we test explicitly). However, if one does not find an
effect of aid on growth, there are many possible explanations. It may that aid was diverted from
intended investment (this could be a rational response to uncertainty of aid inflows, or could be
‘devious’ behaviour by recipients). It may that aid was actually granted for poverty-relief or
social sectors, hence not directly intended for investment. It may even be that aid was directed
to investment but for some reason (one of which may be poor economic policy) the productivity
of investment was low. It may of course, as discussed next, be due to instability in aid flows.
3 On the Importance of Instability and Uncertainty
In the 1980s, largely as a result of the debt crisis, private capital flows to developing countries
declined precariously. In that period, it was clear that foreign aid could, in principle, fulfill an
important role. From the end of the 1980s onwards, international investors’ interest in
developing countries seemed to resume, as indicated by the recent surge of bank loans and,
especially, portfolio and direct investments. However, this does not make foreign aid irrelevant
as the distribution of private capital flows is extremely uneven, leaving most African countries
dependent on foreign aid (Lensink and White, 1998a). This serves to illustrate that aid is only
one source of capital inflow and such inflows are variable over time. Our concern is with aid.3
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We do not provide a theory of the relevance of aid instability, but offer various reasons as to
why it is likely to be important. First, we wish to draw attention to effects on investment as being
central to the effect of aid on growth. Second, we wish to highlight the importance of uncertainty
to investment behaviour. Third, we wish to emphasize that aid has effects as a source of
government revenue, and uncertainty regarding such revenue can have important implications.
Capital Inflows, Investment and Growth
We have already noted that in the models of Burnside and Dollar (1997) and Boone (1996),
effects of aid (and government policy) on savings/investment decisions are mediators of the
impact of aid on growth. Similar results are found in other, quite different, models. Bacha
(1990) provides a three-gap model of the macroeconomic effects of capital transfers. Of
relevance here, it is noteworthy that fundamental to the effect of capital inflows in relaxing a
fiscal constraint on investment is the relationship between public and private investment.
Specifically, the elasticity of investment with respect to aid is greater than unity if there is
crowding-in (complementarity between public and private investment) but less than unity in the
presence of crowding-out. Mosley et al (1987) also emphasize the relationship between aid
and investment, and especially the interaction of public and private investment. Thus, if aid
(uncertainty) affects fiscal behaviour it can affect growth both directly through public investment
and indirectly through the effect on private investment.
Uncertainty and Investment
There is a vast literature on uncertainty, investment and economic growth. Most of this is mainly
theoretical (e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). There is no doubt that uncertainty (regarding costs or
output) affects investment and hence growth. These studies do not, however, consider
uncertainty regarding the source of funds for investment. A parallel can be made with the
literature on the debt relief Laffer curve (e.g. Claessens and Diwan, 1990; Krugman, 1988). A
high debt burden can be a potent disincentive to investment, especially in the presence of
                                                                                                                                                                                                
3 Aid is qualitatively different from other capital inflows, notably because it is to the government and it is aid
inflows that are expected to be fungible. The effect of other inflows is picked up by the inclusion of
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uncertainty about future output (which captures the likelihood of being able to service debts in
the next period). Debt relief, a form of aid, can then encourage higher levels of investment. In a
similar manner, uncertainty regarding aid receipts (or debt relief) may discourage investment.
Levy (1987) distinguishes the effects of unanticipated aid on savings (and investment) from the
effects of anticipated aid. His results showed that although the propensity to consume out of
unanticipated (emergency) aid was not significantly different from unity, the propensity to
consume anticipated aid was no greater than 0.4. This is evidence that the stability of aid flows
(i.e. the degree to which they can be anticipated) influences the likelihood that they will be used
for investment purposes and hence contribute to growth.
Revenue Instability and Fiscal Response
Fiscal response models attempt to address explicitly how aid may alter public sector behaviour,
in particular fiscal behaviour regarding taxation and expenditure. In the standard approach (e.g.
Mosley et al, 1987), governments maximise their utility by attaining revenue and expenditure
targets and aid is treated as exogenous. Franco-Rodriguez et al (1998) endogenise aid:
governments have a target for aid revenue, and this expected revenue is incorporated into their
fiscal planning. In an application for Pakistan, they find that aid seems to increase investment but
to encourage reduced tax effort and greater borrowing. Fiscal response models highlight the fact
that aid is a source of government revenue that will influence fiscal behaviour, in particular (for
our purposes) public investment decisions. If revenues are unstable, it is likely that expenditures
will be altered and investment is often the easiest expenditure heading to cut in the short-term
(i.e. in response to an unanticipated revenue shortfall). A number of recent studies have begun
to address the effects of revenue instability.
Bleaney at al (1995) examined possible causes of tax revenue instability for African economies.
The evidence pointed consistently to a close link between revenue and expenditure instability
over time, suggesting that governments have very limited capacity to maintain expenditures when
                                                                                                                                                                                                
investment in our analysis.
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tax revenues fluctuate. Fielding (1997) conducted a similar analysis, also confining attention to
the effect of tax revenue instability on government expenditure (in a sample of 12 SSA
countries). The results suggested that most of the variation in expenditure could be explained by
variations in tax revenue; debt, interest rates and real depreciation were not consistently
significant. Neither of these studies considered aid, an important source of revenue in low-
income countries.
Gemmell and McGillivray (1998) present an empirical analysis of instability of aid and other
revenue flows for a sample of 48 developing countries. They posit that governments seeking to
maximise social welfare could also be expected to alter behaviour when faced with inter-
temporal instability in revenue flows. They found that aid is more unstable than other general
categories of revenue other than capital revenues, and that aid and tax instability tend to lead to
adjustments to deficits rather than expenditures. There was some time series evidence to suggest
that increased aggregate aid inflows ‘Granger cause’ increased government spending and/or
reduced taxation in the following year. Aid instability appears to have effects.
4 Measuring Capital Inflow Uncertainty
In the literature on uncertainty, investment and economic growth, the construction of the
uncertainty proxy consists of two steps. First, a forecasting equation is estimated in order to
determine the expected component of the variable under consideration. Typically, the
forecasting equation is specified as a first or second-order autoregressive process, possibly
extended with a time trend. Second, the uncertainty proxy is derived by calculating the standard
deviation of the residuals from the forecasting equation (e.g. Aizenman and Marion, 1993).
Although this literature does not explicitly deal with capital flow uncertainty – they mainly
consider demand, cost or policy uncertainty - we follow this approach and measure aid
uncertainty by calculating, for each country in the data set, the standard deviation of the
residuals of the following forecasting equations:4
                                                                
4 We also estimated (1) for bank lending as a percentage of GDP (BANKL) and total private capital inflows as
a percentage of GDP (CAPFL). As our base model includes investment as an explanatory variable, these are
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AIDt = a1 + a2T + a3AIDt-1 + a4AIDt-2 + et, (1)
AIDt = a5 + a6AIDt-1 + a7AIDt-2 + et (2)
AIDt = a8 + a9T + a10 T2 + et (3)
where AID is development aid as a percentage of GDP, T is a time trend and et is an error term
with standard properties. A number of comments are in order. Firstly, one has to select some
criteria for getting a real measure of the value of aid inflows. We choose the aid/GDP ratio as
capturing the relative importance of aid inflows. It is true that the ratio may reflect changes in
GDP with aid constant, rather than changes in aid per se. Nevertheless, the ratio does capture
the importance of aid. Furthermore, it is standard practice to use the aid/GDP ratio in cross-
country growth regressions. We follow this practice in our empirical application, and the
motivation of our study is to test for instability in the aid variable. Consequently, this definition of
aid seems the most appropriate for our purposes.
Secondly, we estimate three measures, the first two intending to capture uncertainty whereas
the third is a measure of instability. Measures similar in spirit to (3) have been employed in the
literature (Bleaney et al, 1995; Gemmell and McGillivray, 1998).5  This is a descriptive measure
of the total amount of instability. Measures (1) and (2) are constructed as measures of
unanticipated or unexpected instability. Implicitly, we posit that governments (the recipients of
aid) have some form of adaptive expectations. Aid commitments are generally known some
years in advance, and one could expect a degree of continuity in donor-recipient relations.
Furthermore, recipients exercise some control over the disbursement of aid funds. Thus,
                                                                                                                                                                                                
not included in the base regression (otherwise we would have multi-collinearity between investment and the
combined sources of investment funds). However, these variables and the associated uncertainty measures,
EBANKL and ECAPFL, are included in the stability analysis.
5 Gemmell and McGillivray (1998) measure instability as the standard deviation of changes in real aid and tax
revenues. As their focus was on fiscal response to instability, this is appropriate. However, the measure
does not incorporate expectations, therefore is in the spirit of (3). If the GDP deflator is used to derive real
values, the results would be comparable to applying (3) to changes in revenue/GDP ratios.
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knowing past values of aid inflows, recipients should be able to anticipate some variability in aid.
Uncertainty is therefore captured by unanticipated aid, as measured in (1) and (2), the former
controlling for a time trend.6
The above equations are estimated for each country over the sample period (1970-1995) using
data from World Bank (1997). We apply the analysis to the entire group of developing
countries (N = 75), as well as to the sub-group of African developing countries (N = 36).
Following the discussion above, we have two measures of aid uncertainty, UAIDT, from (1)
and UAID from (2), and one measure of overall instability, AIDI from (3).
5 Regression Results for the Base Models
Our approach is in line with the now well-known Barro-type of cross-country growth
regressions. Our aim is not to estimate the impact of aid on growth per se, but rather to test if
aid uncertainty affects the relationship between aid and growth. Consequently, the base model is
parsimonious in choice of explanatory variables. A wide range of other explanatory variables
that have been suggested as important are incorporated into the stability analyses of the next
section (in this way, we explicitly test for omitted variable bias). Two respects in which our
formulation differs from that of other contributions deserve comment.
First, we include investment as an explanatory variable. While this is appropriate as investment
should be a principal determinant of growth, it is problematic as aid and investment may be
related. In fact, we demonstrate below that aid is a significant positive determinant of
investment. However, as we estimate growth regressions with and without investment, and
conduct stability tests, we can test whether aid appears to have an effect additional to the effect
through investment. Second, many other studies include policy indicators. Durbarry et al
(1998), for example, include indicators to control for economic policy whereas Burnside and
                                                                
6 There is no a priori reason to prefer (1) to (2). It transpires that the two measures are highly correlated and
perform similarly.
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Dollar (1997) include an interaction term of aid with a policy index.7  Hansen and Tarp (1999)
also include policy variables separately and with an interaction term, and find that ‘good
macroeconomic policies do affect growth [but] good policy is neither necessary for aid to be
effective nor does it enhance the partial effectiveness of aid’ (p. 22). On this basis we omit
policy variables from our base regression, although they are incorporated into the stability tests.
Two base model regressions are estimated:
PCGROWTH = a1 + a2 GDPPC+a3SECR+a4AID+m (4)
PCGROWTH = a5 + a6 GDPPC+a7SECR+a8INVEST+a9AID+m (5)
Where PCGROWTH is the per capita growth rate of GDP and m is an error term with standard
properties. The initial level of per capita GDP (GDPPC) is intended to pick up any conditional
convergence effect so the sign is expected to be negative. The initial secondary-school
enrolment rate (SECR) proxies for the initial stock of human development (the sign is expected
to be positive). Both GDPPC and SECR have been shown to have a robust and significant
impact on economic growth, and hence are taken into account in most recent growth regression
studies (e.g. Sala-i-Martin, 1997a).8
Many growth regressions show that the investment to GDP ratio (INVEST) is significantly
related to economic growth (Levine and Renelt, 1992). However, if the investment/GDP ratio is
included, the interpretation of a significant coefficient on other variables alters. Once INVEST is
included, another variable is said to affect growth via the ‘level of efficiency’ whereas if INVEST
is omitted it is unclear whether any effect of another variable on growth is via investment or via
                                                                
7 In the former study, the policy variables were generally significant and of the expected sign. In the latter
study, however, the policy variables were frequently insignificant when introduced separately. Hansen and
Tarp (1999) replicate the Burnside-Dollar regressions and find that neither fiscal policy variables nor the aid-
policy interaction term are significant. They conclude that the Burnside-Dollar results are not robust.
8 It should however be noted that results are somewhat mixed with respect to the robustness of SECR.
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efficiency (Sala-i-Martin, 1997b). For this reason, we estimate equations in which INVEST is
included and in which INVEST is not included.
The base model regression results are presented in Table 1. For the full sample, GDPPC,
SECR and INVEST are highly significant, with the expected sign; the regression for Africa
without INVEST performs very poorly (it is effectively meaningless). The results with respect to
AID are disappointing, in the sense that it is clearly insignificant in all regressions.
<Insert Table 1 about here>
This could lead one to conclude that foreign aid does not matter at all for economic growth.
More commonly, one would conclude that the regression is not fully or appropriately specified.
One possibility is that uncertainty in aid inflows acts as a constraint on investment, therefore
undermines the effectiveness of aid. Another possibility is that aid uncertainty undermines fiscal
planning (and may induce budget deficits), and this constrains the effectiveness of aid. A further
possibility, of course, is that an important element of unanticipated aid (that generates measured
uncertainty) is in fact emergency aid. In this case uncertainty may pick up adverse shocks to the
economy. Whilst it is not possible, in the current framework, to distinguish these possible effects
(and they are not mutually exclusive), all point to uncertainty of aid inflows as potentially related
to the effectiveness of aid (although in the final case mentioned above, it is the measure of
uncertainty that picks up a shock that may reduce the effectiveness of aid). The results including
measures of aid uncertainty and instability are given in Table 2 (for all countries) and Table 3
(for the African countries).
<Insert Table 2 and Table 3 about here>
The results of this new set of regressions are encouraging. The coefficients on the two aid
uncertainty measures (UAIDT and UAID) are in all cases significant with the expected negative
sign. Moreover, when these uncertainty measures are included AID becomes significant and
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positive for regressions with all developing countries (Table 2). A plausible interpretation is that
uncertainty of aid inflows has a negative association with growth performance but, controlling for
uncertainty, aid inflows have a positive impact on growth.9  This positive impact of aid holds
whether INVEST is included or excluded, although the inclusion of INVEST reduces the size
(and significance) of the coefficient on aid. We explore this further below. Finally, we can note
that the measure of overall instability (AIDI) was insignificant and had no effect on the results.
This is consistent with the argument that it is uncertainty, i.e. deviations from expected inflows,
that are important rather than instability per se.
Results for the subgroup of African countries (Table 3) are similar. It is still the case that AID
becomes significant if uncertainty is included for the models without INVEST. When we
incorporate INVEST, however, the aid variable becomes insignificant although the uncertainty
measure remains negatively significant. A plausible interpretation is that, in African countries, aid
does not have an efficiency effect on growth; any effect of aid is through investment (evidence
for this is provided below). We find that aid uncertainty has a negative effect on growth,
consistent with the argument that uncertainty may constrain investment. Furthermore, the
evidence that AID is positive and significant when INVEST is excluded is consistent with the
argument that aid is (at least largely) directed to investment. Indeed, as we control for
uncertainty, we can go further and suggest that it is anticipated aid which tends to go to
investment (the same finding as Levy, 1987).
<insert Table 4 about here>
It is apparent that the link between aid and investment is itself quite important. Table 4 reports
the results from estimating a simple investment equation. The overall performance of the
regressions is acceptable. There are noticeable differences in the results for all countries and
                                                                
9 Similar results were obtained when alternative sources of capital were introduced (separately). Domestic
bank lending was only positive and significant when its uncertainty EBANKL (see footnote 4) was included;
private capital inflows alone were significant if INVEST was omitted, but when ECAPFL was added the
coefficient was positive and significant in regressions with and without INVEST.
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those for African countries only. If AID is included alone, it is not significant in the regression for
all developing countries. However, once we control for uncertainty, the coefficient on AID is
positive and just significant, while the coefficient on UAIDT is negative and significant. For
African countries only, the coefficient on UAIDT is not significant although the inclusion of
uncertainty increases the significance of the coefficient on AID (which is positive and significant
in both regressions). We are not here attempting to estimate the proportion of aid allocated to
investment, but merely to demonstrate that there appears to be a positive relationship between
aid and investment. Hansen and Tarp (1999: 29), in a more comprehensive estimation, also find
evidence that aid is a positive significant determinant of investment, and World Bank (1998:
133) reports evidence that aid has a positive and significant impact on public sector investment.
These results support the argument that the impact of aid on growth, or at least a major
component of the impact, is via a positive impact on investment. Consequently, we should not
be surprised that when investment is included with aid in regressions for all countries (Table 2),
the significance of aid falls (but is not eliminated). It appears, nevertheless, that aid has an impact
on growth additional to the impact through investment. For African countries, however, there is
no support for aid having this additional effect. This is consistent with the view that efficiency, or
the return to capital, is lower in African countries.
6 Stability Analysis
Our regression results can be challenged as (potentially) subject to omitted variable bias, and
therefore our findings may not be robust. This would be the case if other variables that are
closely related to the variable(s) under consideration are excluded from the regression. We
address this concern by conducting a large-scale stability analysis to test the reliability of the
base results, following the method proposed by Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b). This approach
is based on computing the cumulative distribution function from the mean and standard deviation
of the coefficient on the variable of interest in all regressions.
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The analysis starts by defining the pool of variables out of which the additional variables are
drawn. We use a set of 23 domestic and international macroeconomic variables (listed in the
Appendix). Next, we determine all possible combinations of three of the 23 variables and
perform regressions in which the base variables (equations (4) and (5) with aid uncertainty) are
included as well as three additional variables.10 This implies that, for all base models, 1771
variants (models j) are estimated. For each regression, depending on whether INVEST is
included, eight or nine independent variables are taken into account (the constant; GDPPC;
SECR; INVEST; AID; UAIDT, or UAID and three additional variables from the pool of 23).
For all regressions, coefficients and standard errors for the aid flow and uncertainty variables
are obtained. By assuming that the distribution of the estimates of the coefficients is normal and
calculating the mean and the standard deviation of this distribution, the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) can be calculated. More precisely, if b j is the coefficient for the variable in
variant (model) j, and sj is the standard error of the coefficient b j, we proxy the mean and the













In Table 5, the mean estimate is given in the column ‘Coef’ and the mean standard deviation in
the column ‘St. error’. By using a table for the (cumulative) NORMAL distribution, we can
calculate which fraction of the cumulative distribution function is on the right or left-hand side of
zero. The test statistic used is defined as the mean over the standard deviation of the
distribution. In Table 5, CDF denotes the larger of the two areas. If CDF is above 0.95, we
can conclude that the variable under consideration has a robust effect on economic growth. A
disadvantage of the Sala-i-Martin test is that it is based on the average values of the coefficient
                                                                
10 It is arbitrary to take all combinations of three variables. However, the number of regressions increases
dramatically when combinations of more than three variables are used, while combinations of less than three
is not satisfactory as then the number of regressors in the equations may become too few.
Aid Uncertainty and Growth 15
and the standard error. This implies that a variable may satisfy the robustness test yet in a
substantial proportion of the regressions the coefficient is insignificant. To address this, we
report in the last column of Table 5 the percentage of all regressions for which the variable
under consideration is significant (at the 90% level).
<Insert Table 5 about here>
Table 5 shows that the results obtained in the previous section are robust when INVEST is not
included in the model. In general, the uncertainty measure is particularly robust, whereas AID is
significant in only about 70 per cent of the variants. This is consistent with the evidence that aid
has a positive impact on investment. If INVEST is included, foreign aid does not have a robust
effect on GDP growth, although uncertainty remains quite robust. These results suggest that aid,
if one controls for uncertainty, has a robust effect on economic growth via investment. This
holds both for the entire group of developing countries, as well as for the sub-group of African
countries. An inference is that anticipated aid is invested and therefore contributes to growth.
There is no robust evidence that aid impacts on growth via an efficiency effect.
7 Conclusions
This paper examines a previously unconsidered issue, namely that the effect of aid on growth
may depend on uncertainty associated with aid inflows. Our principal concern is that the impact
of aid on growth depends fundamentally on the effect of aid on the level and efficiency of
investment. Uncertainty of aid inflows can have an adverse effect on the level of investment
(especially public investment) and thus on growth. It is possible that uncertainty of aid inflows
could also constrain policy. Specifically, aid shortfalls (relative to expectations) could increase
the budget deficit (with further adverse effects). More generally, aid is an important component
of revenue and therefore affects fiscal behaviour. Uncertainty could therefore have adverse
effects on fiscal policy.
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The empirical analysis of this paper examined the effectiveness of aid controlling for uncertainty
of aid inflows. We found that aid uncertainty is consistently and significantly negatively related to
growth, and this result is robust. Investment appeared to be the principal determinant of growth
and, when included with investment, foreign aid does not have a robust effect on growth. The
results suggest that aid, controlling for uncertainty, has a robust effect on economic growth via
the level of investment. This suggests that stability in donor-recipient relationships should
enhance the effectiveness of aid, by making it easier for recipients to predict future aid inflows,
that may permit more investment and better fiscal planning.
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Appendix: List of Variables
AID = development aid as a percentage of GDP
AIDI = foreign aid instability
BANKL = bank and trade related lending as a percentage of GDP
BMP = black market premium, calculated as [(black market rate/official rate)-1].
BUDDEF = overall budget deficits, including grants as a percentage of  GDP
CAPFL = total external private capital flows as a percentage of GDP
CIVLIB = index of civil liberties
CREDITPR = credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP
DEBTGDP = the external debt to GDP ratio
DEBTS = total external debt service as a percentage of GDP
DEPR = the deposit rate (%)
EBANKL = foreign bank lending uncertainty
ECAPFL = total private capital flow uncertainty
EXPGDP = exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP
GDPPC= GDP per capita in 1970
GOVCGDP =  government  consumption as a percentage of GDP
INFL = the annual inflation rate
INVEST = average investment to GDP ratio over 1970-1995 period
MGDP = average money and quasi money to GDP ratio over the 1970-1995 period
PCGROWTH = average real per capita growth rate over 1970-1995 period.
PINSTAB = measure of political instability
PRENR = primary school enrolment rate
PRIGHTS = index of political rights
RINTR = real interest rate (%)
SECR = secondary school enrolment rate in 1970
STDINFL = the standard deviation of the annual inflation rate, calculated from the inflation figures
TAXGDP = total taxes as a percentage of GDP
TRADE = exports plus imports to GDP ratio, a measure of the degree of openness.
UAIDT = foreign aid uncertainty
WARDUM = dummy variable with a value of unity for countries that participated in at least one external war
during the period 1960-1985, and zero to all other countries.
The source for all variables is World Development Indicators (World Bank, 1997), except for BMP, CIVLIB,
PINSTAB, PRIGHTS and WARDUM that were obtained from the Barro-Lee data set (Barro and Lee, 1994),
and the uncertainty measures calculated by the authors. The variables from the Barro-Lee data set refer to
averages for the 1970-1990 period. Unless otherwise stated, all other variables refer to averages over the
1970-1995 period.
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Table 1: Base model without uncertainty terms





































R2 0.20 0.41 0.05 0.53
Obs. 75 75 36 36
MDEPV 0.61 0.61 0.07 0.07
SDDEPV 1.69 1.69 1.66 1.66
F 7.25 13.97 1.64 10.97
JB 0.24 4.51 0.17 4.72
Note: dependent variable is PCGROWTH. MDEPV = mean of the dependent variable;
SDDEPV = standard deviation of the dependent variable; R2  = adjusted R2 ; F = F-statistic.
The t-values in parentheses are based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors (this applies to all tables and the stability tests). JB = Jarque-Bera normality test. Obs.
= number of observations.
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Table 2: Base model with uncertainty, All countries



































































R2 0.37 0.51 0.38 0.51 0.19 0.40
F 11.96 16.23 12.13 16.68 5.41 11.04
JB 0.44 1.61 0.69 1.41 0.13 4.64
Note: as for Table 1.
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Table 3: Base model with uncertainty, African countries



































































R2 0.25 0.60 0.34 0.61 0.03 0.52
F 3.90 11.39 4.02 11.95 1.24 8.56
JB 0.01 0.18 0.06 2.70 0.09 5.04
Note: as for Table 1.
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Table 4: Aid and Investment










































R2 0.32 0.36 0.56 0.57
F 11.44 10.59 19.17 14.68
N 88 88 43 43
Note: Dependent variable is INVEST. Per capita GDP (GDPPC) was insignificant for
the African sample and hence omitted. TRADE is openness, MGDP is the ratio
of money to GDP, a measure of financial development (see Appendix). Other
measures of aid instability were included: UAID performed similarly to UAIDT,
AIDI was insignificant.
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Table 5: Stability Analysis
Countries Variable R2 Coef. St. Error CDF Perc.
Without INVEST in base model
All AID 0.39 0.0479 0.0230 0.981 0.691
All UAIDT -0.2691 0.0690 1.000 1.000
Africa AID 0.29 0.0662 0.0212 1.000 0.931
Africa UAIDT -0.2063 0.0726 0.998 0.952
All AID 0.39 0.0457 0.0224 0.979 0.685
All UAID -0.2451 0.0633 1.000 1.000
Africa AID 0.30 0.0642 0.0208 0.999 0.936
Africa UAID -0.1918 0.0683 0.998 0.961
With INVEST in base model
All AID 0.53 0.0230 0.0192 0.889 0.343
All UAIDT -0.1984 0.0652 0.999 0.986
Africa AID 0.59 0.0140 0.0183 0.776 0.235
Africa UAIDT -0.1087 0.0596 0.966 0.592
All AID 0.53 0.0230 0.0187 0.891 0.335
All UAID -0.1857 0.0604 0.999 0.956
Africa AID 0.60 0.0158 0.0184 0.805 0.245
Africa UAID -0.1128 0.0583 0.973 0.666
Note: The aid variable and related uncertainty proxy appear in the same equation. R2 : the
average adjusted R2 of all individual regressions for the equation concerned. Coef: the
average coefficient for all individual regressions; St. Error: the average standard error for all
individual regressions; CDF: the cumulative distribution function (>0.95 signifies robustness);
Perc: the percentage of all cases in which the coefficient for aid or the uncertainty measure is
significant at the 90% level.
